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n these remarks I restrict my attention to
the model with divisible output. That
model, which is used to examine the
possible roles of two ﬁat currencies in a
two-country world, is true to some general
principles that I like. Neither the physical
environment of the model nor the equilib-
rium concept dictates in an obvious way
that one currency has a special role in one
of the countries and the other currency has
a special role in the other country. Coun-
tries are deﬁned by exogenous pairwise
meeting patterns. A given resident of a
country is encountered more frequently by
other residents than by nonresidents, and
countries may differ in the overall rates at
which their residents meet people. A po-
tential role for quid pro quo trade involv-
ing outside assets is implied by specializa-
tion in consumption and production of
nonstorable goods and by either anonymity
or private information about individual
trading histories. The only assets are indi-
visible ﬁat currencies, and the currency-
creation rule and the assumption that con-
sumption must precede production imply ,
among other things, that total currency
holdings for an individual in a steady state
cannot exceed one unit. The equilibrium
concept is implied by rational expectations
and the bargaining rule that potential con-
sumers in single-coincidence meetings (all
meetings are either no-coincidence meet-
ings or single-coincidence meetings) make
take it or leave it offers. Obviously, none of
these assumptions ties a particular cur-
rency to a particular country.
If the populations of the two countries
were constant and there were ﬁxed stocks
of two ﬁat currencies, red currency and
blue currency, then, although nothing ex-
ogenous identiﬁes a currency with a coun-
try, there might be equilibria and steady
states where the currencies and countries
are matched in some way. We certainly ex-
pect that there would be at least one equi-
librium where they are not matched—an
equilibrium in which people ignore the
color of currency. In this model, a com-
mon growth rate of the population is as-
sumed and a fraction of the new residents
of each country begin with one unit of a
particular currency. This assumption pro-
duces some connection between curren-
cies and countries. For example, it pre-
cludes the existence of a steady state in
which residents of one country hold only
the currency issued by the other country.
Although I like the general strategy
taken by Alberto Trejos and Randall
Wright, I would approach certain details
differently. First, the decision to consider
only equilibria “where trade always occurs
if a buyer with Currency i meets a seller
from Country i” is not innocuous. Second,
I do not like the assumption that consump-
tion must precede production. Third, 
I think that they should devote more atten-
tion to a discussion of the role played by
the indivisibility of currency and the
bound on individual holdings—assump-
tions that seem to be adopted only to make
the model more tractable.
CURRENCY i IS ALWAYS
USED TO BUY FROM
RESIDENTS OF COUNTRY i
Trejos and Wright look only at steady
states in which anyone with Country i
currency is willing to use it to buy from
residents of Country i. A consequence is
that they ignore a potential steady state in
which people ignore the color of currency,
but residents of the rich country (in terms
of meeting frequencies) do not buy from
residents of the poor country. As the au-
thors point out, if the residents of one
country meet potential traders at a higher
rate than do residents of the other country,
then the latter are, ceteris paribus, willing
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to produce less than the former for a unit
of currency. If this difference is sufﬁciently
large, then there is no steady state with two
international currencies in which the effec-
tive single currency is used to buy from
residents of both countries. For such para-
meters, however, I suspect that there is a
steady state in which people ignore the
color of currency, no rich-country resident
with either currency buys from a poor-
country resident, and any poor-country
resident buys from residents of both coun-
tries. In such a steady state, no poor-coun-
try resident holds rich country currency,
whereas rich-country residents hold all of
their own currency and some—maybe
most—of the poor country’s currency. If
there were no growth, then such a steady
state would have residents of the poor 
country holding no currency and engaging
in no trade. When such a steady state exists,
there may be other steady states, which 
Trejos and Wright call no-international-
currency steady states. In these steady
states, the two currencies play distinct roles
and the residents of the poor country get 
to use their own low-valued currency and
consequently do better than they do when
there is effectively one currency.
We know from results the authors pre-
sent that such steady states exist for some
parameters, namely those with low rates 
of meetings across countries. Thus this
model seems to have implications that re-
semble those of the optimal currency area
literature even though prices in this model
are ﬂexible. This model, however, has its
own inﬂexibility—the indivisibility of cur-
rency. We do not know whether the pre-
ceding results and conjectured results
would survive if the authors made cur-
rency considerably more divisible than it is
in the current model. Certainly, the restric-
tion that Currency i is used to buy from




Next, I want to comment on the as-
sumption that consumption must precede
production. I feel somewhat responsible
for this assumption because Aiyagari and
I
1 introduced it in work that explored
the model in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989),
a model with indivisible goods and ﬁat
objects, all of which are storable. In that
model, storable goods are a form of pro-
ductive capital because they can be con-
sumed subsequently by someone. The
storage capacity assumption in the original
formulation implies therefore that free dis-
posal of ﬁat objects increases productive
capital, which seems objectionable.
In the current model, because goods
are not storable, a storage capacity assump-
tion does not have that implication. More-
over, because goods are divisible in the cur-
rent model, the assumption that consump-
tion must precede production gives rise to
an unappealing discontinuity. Subsequent
to production, consumption of any positive
amount allows future production of any
desired amount, but zero consumption pre-
cludes future production. Finally, as Trejos
and Wright note, it matters which route is
taken to get an upper bound on total cur-
rency holdings. If they directly assume an
upper bound, as I think is preferable in 
this model, then trade is possible in single-
coincidence meetings in which the con-
sumer has one of the currencies and the
producer has the other.
INDIVISIBILITY
AND A BOUND ON
INDIVIDUAL HOLDINGS
Indivisibility and a bound on individ-
ual holdings play important roles. They
play a crucial role for the policies that
Trejos and Wright discuss at some length,
policies that determine the fraction of new-
born who start with a unit of currency.
These policies determine the per capita
nominal stocks of the two currencies.
Absent indivisibility and a bound on indi-
vidual holdings, there would be neutrality
for such policies. That is, the set of steady
states would be invariant in real terms to
the policies. Therefore, all the ﬁndings 
pertaining to the policies are due to the 
indivisibility and to the bound. Moreover,
1See Aiyagari and Wallace
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the indivisibility and the bound play 
different roles for the policies studied.
An upper bound, speciﬁed in nominal
terms as in this model, gives rise to the
possibility that increases in the amount of
currency reduce trade and welfare because
such increases raise the fraction of
people who are holding maximum wealth
and who therefore will not produce. An
indivisibility, also speciﬁed in nominal
terms, gives rise to the possibility that in-
creases in the amount of currency are ben-
eﬁcial because the larger the amount of
currency, the less important is a given in-
divisibility. Given the role played by those
assumptions for the policies studied,
Trejos and Wright should either defend
those assumptions on grounds other than
tractability or should pay much less atten-
tion to the policies. If the authors do not
want to defend the indivisibility of cur-
rency and the bound on individual hold-
ings, then they should emphasize results
that are potentially robust to departures
from those assumptions. Some of the mul-
tiplicity results may be robust. The policy
implications studied are not.
CONCLUSION
I conclude with the question I men-
tioned at the outset: What connects a 
particular ﬁat currency to a particular
country? It seems obvious that if we want
any equilibrium to display connections
between particular currencies and coun-
tries, then we must impose policies that
give rise to the connections. As noted
above, a policy of this sort exists in this
model: New residents of each country
start with a particular currency. That is, a
mysterious entity in the model, the gov-
ernment, is issuing a particular currency
to residents of a particular country. One
could strengthen this policy in the follow-
ing way: One could have this mysterious
entity involved in a variety of transactions
and have it, as a matter of policy, favor
one currency in its transactions.2 Because
models of the sort presented by Trejos
and Wright have scope for the possibility
that transactions of others inﬂuence the
value of currency to everyone, we may
ﬁnd that fairly innocuous policies of this
sort end up implying the connections be-
tween currencies and countries that we
often see.
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